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DELEGATING TO INTERNATIONAL
COURTS: SELF-BINDING VS. OTHERBINDING DELEGATION
KAREN J. ALTER*
I
INTRODUCTION
One often hears complaints that international courts are undermining
national sovereignty. Critics tend to associate a compromise of sovereignty with
the claim that courts are exceeding their mandate or running amok. This article
explores the linkage between these two notions—sovereignty being
compromised, and courts exceeding their mandate—by exploring the distinction
between “self-binding” and “other-binding” delegation to courts.
A central claim of this article is that using a single lens to view delegation to
courts distorts our understandings of the political role of judges. Courts play
four distinct roles within political systems: dispute adjudication, administrative
review, criminal enforcement, and constitutional review. In some of these roles,
legislative actors delegate decisionmaking authority to courts as an “otherbinding” means of social control; through delegation, states primarily bind
others actors (citizens, businesses, government employees, administrative
agencies, police, et cetera) to follow the interpretation and application of legal
rules by courts. In other roles, legislative bodies or states bind themselves
(“self-binding”), subjecting their decisionmaking authority to judicial oversight
so as to enhance their own credibility as a “rule of law” political system. Selfbinding delegations are by their very nature sovereignty-compromising. Otherbinding delegations to courts are more frequent and less likely to be
sovereignty-compromising. The situation of courts’ exceeding their mandate,
and thus compromising sovereignty, applies, but rarely: when a court transforms
a given role, turning an other-binding authority into a self-binding role.
Part II defines more fully the difference between self- and other-binding
delegation to courts, and maps these differences onto the four different roles
courts play in a political system. The discussion starts with delegation in the
domestic context because international delegation borrows from the domestic
model. The discussion identifies when and how delegating the same role to a
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court will affect national sovereignty differently at the domestic and
international levels. Part II also discusses how states try to limit the authority of
courts in each role.
Part III examines the empirical record on delegating specific roles to specific
international courts (ICs), using as data delegation to all existing ICs, twenty in
total.1 The analysis helps explain an empirical puzzle in the trend of delegating
authority to ICs. Since 1990, there has been a proliferation in the number of
ICs2 and in IC usage so that seventy-five percent of the total IC output of
decisions, opinions, and rulings (24,863 out of 33,057) have come since 1990.
These “new” ICs are not only recent creations; they are qualitatively different
entities.3 Newer ICs are more likely to have compulsory jurisdiction and either
private access or access for international nonstate actors to initiate litigation,
even though most observers agree that these features make ICs more
independent and more likely to rule on cases in which a government is an
unwilling participant.4
State concerns about national sovereignty have not lessened since 1990.
What is this change to “new” ICs about? I argue that the trend towards creating
and using ICs with compulsory jurisdiction and nonstate actor access follows
from the decision to use ICs in roles other than interstate dispute resolution—
namely for administrative review, enforcement, and, less frequently,
constitutional review. Most of these additional roles involve other-binding

1. This article adopts the definition of an IC created by the Project on International Courts and
Tribunals (PICT): ICs are (1) permanent institutions, (2) composed of independent judges (3) that
adjudicate disputes between two or more entities, one of which is a state or international organization.
They (4) work on the basis of predetermined rules of procedure and (5) render decisions that are
binding. For a discussion of this definition, see PICT’s synoptic chart. The Project on Int’l Courts and
Tribunals, Research Matrix (2000), http://www.pict-pcti.org/matrix/matrixhome.html (last visited Feb. 7,
2008). This discussion does not include certain African courts that exist on paper but do not yet exist in
practice. See discussion infra note 35. Thus, if anything, this article underreports the trend of delegation
to international legal bodies.
2. See Cesare Romano, The Proliferation of International Judicial Bodies: The Pieces of the
Puzzle, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 709 (1999). See also Jose Alvarez, The New Dispute Settlers:
(Half) Truths and Consequences, 38 TEX. INT’L L.J. 405 (2003); Benedict Kingsbury, Is the Proliferation
of International Courts and Tribunals a Systemic Problem?, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 679, 680
(1999); Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch & Richard B. Stewart, The Emergence of Global
Administrative Law, 68 LAW & COMTEMP. PROBS. 15, 16 (2005); Chester Brown, The Proliferation of
International Courts and Tribunals: Finding Your Way Through the Maze, 3 MELBOURNE J. INT’L L.
453, 454–57 (2002) (reviewing MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS (Philippe
Sands, Ruth Mackenzie & Yuval Shany eds., 1999)).
3. Karen J. Alter, Private Litigants and the New International Courts, 39 COMP. POL. STUD. 22,
25–27 (2006).
4. Compulsory jurisdiction and private access limit the ability of states to block a case from
proceeding to court. These features are emphasized in Curtis Bradley and Judith Kelley’s introduction
to this volume as shaping the extent to which delegation to ICs is sovereignty-compromising. These are
the critical features of ICs discussed in the debate over IC independence between Eric Posner, John
Yoo, Laurence Helfer, and Anne-Marie Slaughter. See Laurence Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Why
States Create International Tribunals: A Response to Professors Posner and Yoo, 93 CAL. L. REV 899
(2005); Eric A. Posner & John C. Yoo, Judicial Independence in International Tribunals, 93 CAL. L.
REV. 1 (2005).
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delegation wherein ICs are empowered to review the actions of international
actors or the decisions of national administrators tasked with implementing
international rules. And it appears that, numerically speaking, most of the
increase in IC activity involves ICs playing “other-binding” roles.5 This analysis
explains why ICs increasingly have design features that make them highly
independent, yet why relatively few international legal rulings are controversial.
It also helps to situate the more sovereignty-compromising examples of
delegation to ICs within the larger universe of delegation to ICs.
Part IV concludes by addressing the implications of this analysis for debates
about IC independence as it relates to sovereignty costs in delegating to ICs,
including debates regarding principal–agent theories and about whether
“dependent” international courts are more effective than independent ICs. The
article urges a focus on judicial roles, rather than on the design of the court, to
understand the extent to which sovereignty becomes compromised. It also
suggests that expectations attached to judicial roles, rather than concerns about
judges being sanctioned, shape how judges think about deference to political
bodies and how audiences react to judicial rulings that upset powerful actors.
II
THE LOGIC OF DELEGATION TO COURTS—DISPUTE ADJUDICATION,
ADMINISTRATIVE, ENFORCEMENT, AND CONSTITUTIONAL ROLES
As Curtis Bradley and Judith Kelley note in their opening article, delegation
of authority inherently involves sovereignty costs.6 The heart of the issue is the
magnitude of sovereignty costs. What is being delegated to courts is the power
to interpret the legal rules. The sovereignty risk in ceding interpretive authority
to courts is that judicial rulings can shift the meaning of law in ways that can be
politically irreversible.7 This risk is not just hypothetical. Constitutional review
involves nullifying laws passed by legislative bodies, while administrative review
involves rejecting decisions made by public actors. Thus, if judicial actors play
their intended roles, judges will at times disagree with, rule against, or render
interpretations that run counter to what the makers and the enforcers of the law
might have wanted, and what the democratic majority might prefer.
Although delegation to courts always risks that the judge will interpret the
law in unanticipated and unwanted ways, the risk to national sovereignty

5. See discussion infra Part III.C.
6. Curtis A. Bradley & Judith Kelley, The Concept of International Delegation, 71 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (Winter 2008).
7. As many have shown, the voting thresholds required to reverse legal interpretation are
particularly challenging to surmount because reversing legal rulings means disempowering actors who
prefer the legally created status quo, and if reversal is perceived as political interference in a legal
domain, defenders of the rule of law will rally to the side of judges. See Karen J. Alter, Who Are the
Masters of the Treaty?: European Governments and the European Court of Justice, 52 INT’L ORG. 121,
136–40 (1998); Brian A. Marks, A Model of Judicial Influence on Congressional Policy Making: Grove
City College v. Bell (1984) (1989) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Wash. Univ., St. Louis) (on file with
author).
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associated with delegation to courts varies—not primarily in terms of the design
of the court, but rather by the role the court is asked to play. Self-binding
delegation to courts involve high sovereignty costs because the defendant in the
case will almost always be a state actor, and the legal review will involve asking
whether legislative actors violated the law or exceeded their authority. Otherbinding delegations to courts involve lower sovereignty costs because the
defendants will primarily be private actors, or the court will mainly be
monitoring to see that public actors faithfully adhere to the legislative will.
Delegation to courts brings benefits as well. Litigants can hope that a judge
ruling in their favor will make it more likely that the loser in the case will
change their behavior. Governments and legislatures can hope that judicial
rulings in their favor increase their credibility, imparting a “rule of law”
imprimatur on public actions. After defining these concepts more fully, this Part
identifies the logic of delegation in four judicial roles one finds in domestic legal
systems, and how international delegation to courts differs from delegating the
same role domestically.
A. Self-Binding and Other-Binding Delegation
In all cases of delegation to courts, judges are delegated the decisionmaking
authority to interpret and apply the law to the case at hand. The sovereignty
risk associated with this delegation is primarily shaped by the judicial role
(dispute adjudication, enforcement, administrative, or constitutional review)
because the role defines which actor is likely to be the defendant in the case, the
nature of the decision or rule that is subject to review, and whether judges are
more likely to defer to legislative will in their interpretations. A stylized
historical narrative helps explain this difference.
In earlier times and in smaller societies, there was no delegation to judges;
chiefs and kings both made law and served as the interpreters of the law. As
territories grew, delegation of interpretive authority became unavoidable.
Sovereign actors—those with the authority to make law—primarily delegated
adjudicative authority, the power to make a decision about a controversy or a
dispute. Although sovereign actors were ceding interpretation of the law, they
were not themselves subject to the interpretations of their “judges,” mainly
because no judge would presume to know better than the sovereign what the
law meant. This delegation was “other-binding”—sovereigns were subjecting
others to judicial interpretations of the law. As the state apparatus grew, the
role of judges grew. Cases still appeared as controversies judges were asked to
resolve, but when the subject of cases became state actors, judges ended up in a
monitoring-and-enforcing role, reviewing whether the king’s other agents (for
example tax collectors, local rulers, state administrators, et cetera) were
faithfully following the sovereign’s laws. Neither type of delegation—
adjudicative, or monitoring and enforcing—bound the sovereign so long as the
king himself was never subjected to the authority of the court.
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With the advent of constitutional democracy came self-binding delegation,
wherein branches of government agreed to limit their powers by binding
themselves to the authority of others—including to the authority of courts.8
Also, the introduction of increasingly complex delegation chains complicates
the story. As states have sought to control more elements of the economy and
society, governments have created many types of public actors, including
administrative agencies, entire criminal-justice systems, and executive agencies
that sometimes have what amounts to delegated legislative authority. States
have increasingly subjected the actions of these actors to judicial oversight. Do
we call such oversight self-binding, or other-binding? The distinction can be
subtle, and the difference can be intentionally or unintentionally blurred as the
political roles of judges and of public actors shift. This article considers otherbinding contemporary delegation wherein judges oversee implementation of
legal rules by public actors, so long as a state’s legislative outputs or authority is
not being subjected to judicial review.
This article operationalizes the distinction between self- and other-binding
delegations by examining four roles courts play in political systems. The
dispute-adjudication role is analogous to the king’s representative resolving
disputes. It pertains when there is a disagreement in a contractual relationship,
and the disagreement is brought to a judge to resolve. The defendant in the case
is a signatory to the contract, and either the contract itself or the relation of the
contract to a larger framework of rules is under review. The other roles are
contemporary outgrowths of constitutional democracy. In the enforcement role,
a judge monitors police and prosecutors as they use the state’s coercive power.
In administrative review, a judge checks the legal validity of the decisions,
actions, and non-actions of public administrative actors, who themselves rely on
delegated authority. Constitutional review checks whether the law created by
legislatures or interpreted and applied by governments, or both, coheres with
the constitution.
By its very nature, constitutional-review authority has the highest
sovereignty risk because by definition it involves judges reviewing the legality of
laws and, by definition, judges are supposed to prioritize the constitution over
the will of the legislature. The other types of delegation vary in the sovereignty
risks involved, depending on whether a public actor is likely to be a plaintiff or
a defendant, the scope of judicial review, and whether the court’s jurisdiction is
compulsory. These factors can vary for domestic and international delegation of
the same judicial role, even when the international court’s design mimics its
domestic counterpart identically.
This Part identifies jurisdictional elements of courts, identifying how to
recognize if a specific judicial role has been delegated to an IC. At the domestic

8. Of course this binding is somewhat fictitious, since the self-binding could be undone through a
new constitutional act. The metaphor Jon Elster uses is that of Ulysses, who ties himself to the mast to
avoid the temptation of the Sirens. See JON ELSTER, ULYSSES UNBOUND: STUDIES IN RATIONALITY,
PRECOMMITMENT, AND CONSTRAINTS (2000).
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level, the legislative origin of a judicial role may be hard to trace, and there may
indeed be no explicit legislative grant delegating authority. At the international
level, however, judicial roles are defined in the founding treaties of ICs. This
Part identifies key jurisdictional features associated with specific judicial roles:
whether a role requires compulsory jurisdiction or private access for nonstate
actors to initiate litigation; whether the role is other-binding, self-binding, or
both; and how these categories differ internationally compared to domestically.
Note that this discussion describes each judicial role as a Weberian ideal type,
focusing on the function for the state that the court is serving in each role. Ideal
types are useful in identifying essential characteristics and drawing distinctions,
but by definition ideal types simplify and do not comport with reality.9 With
respect to the analysis here, the ideal types both underemphasize and
overemphasize variations one might find within a category.10 The ideal type
approach is nonetheless useful because it allows comparison across roles,
revealing how the logic inherent in the delegation act varies by judicial role.
In practice, judicial roles may change, in some cases morphing a court
considerably from its original design. The role designations inherent in the
original act of delegation likely shape the design of the legal body and, at least
originally, the nature of the cases raised. When litigants ask judges questions
that push them outside of their original roles, when judges embrace these
opportunities to expand legal doctrine, and when such doctrinal shifts are
accepted by legal and political communities, the court’s role will morph. As
judicial roles evolve, the roles become hats judges put on as they decide legal
issues. When thrust into a role, the judge dons the role, and with it the logic
associated with the role, as he would a hat. As judges change roles, they change
hats. In this context, the ideal type role would provide a first-cut “logic of
appropriateness” that would set expectations as to what the judge should do in
the case.11 Even if the judge were disappointing powerful actors or
compromising sovereignty, so long as judges stay close to the expected role-

9. The concept of an “ideal type” was introduced by Max Weber. “Ideal types” are intellectual
constructs representing definitions that are logically controlled and conceptually pure. By definition,
ideal types are not meant to represent reality. MAX WEBER, FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN
SOCIOLOGY 59–60 (H.H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills eds., trans., 1946).
10. The categories underemphasize variation because within a single role (for example,
administrative review, constitutional review, et cetera), different national designs and differences in the
powers given to courts will be important in shaping how a court plays its role. For example, the political
role of constitutional courts will vary based on whether constitutional courts have abstract judicialreview authority, concrete judicial-review power, or both. In addition, variation in how judges and legal
cultures employ notions like standing, burden of proof, the standard of review, et cetera, will lead to
meaningful cross-national variation despite the similarity in role across systems. The categories
overemphasize variation across roles because, in practice, cases can involve multiple issues, leading a
court to assume multiple roles within a single case. For an example of these differences, see ALEC
STONE SWEET, GOVERNING WITH JUDGES: CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS IN EUROPE (2000).
11. On the logic of appropriateness, see James March & Johan Olsen, The Institutional Dynamics
of International Political Orders, in EXPLORATION AND CONTESTATION IN THE STUDY OF WORLD
POLITICS 303, 311–12 (Katzenstein, Keohane & Krasner eds., 1999).
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based logic, the ruling is less likely to be controversial, and it will be harder to
pin on the court the charge that it was “exceeding its authority.”
B. Delegation of Dispute-Adjudication Authority to Courts
Dispute adjudication in its ideal typical form is private-law adjudication.
Two private parties subject to the law bring a dispute to a judge, who renders an
interpretation that binds both parties. These disputes are usually conceptualized
as arising from contractual disagreements—differences in opinions regarding
duties and obligations owed—though the “contracts” are often informal and
implicit. Shapiro identifies this judicial role as participating in social control.12 In
delegating to judges the authority to interpret the law, state actors are seizing
the parties’ desires to have a judicial resolution of a dispute as an opportunity to
bring state laws into the private realm—into neighborly disputes, business
interactions, and even family decisions. In choosing the legal outcome, judges
are choosing the state’s desired resolution—that custody of a child goes first to
blood relatives, that firms be accountable for their actions, et cetera.
Dispute adjudication can involve a mix of public and private actors, yet still
involve an other-binding, social-control logic. States want their interlocutors to
follow general contractual rules so that private actors will be willing to enter
into trustful relationships like signing contracts, letting school buses bring their
children to school, and so forth. When public contractors are held accountable
in the same terms as private contractors, the social-control logic is still at play—
states are binding their interlocutors to follow a set of common rules.13
How does one know if an IC has dispute-adjudication authority? Although
it is easy to identify administrative review or enforcement authority, dispute
adjudication is a catchall category. Every “concrete” legal case has two parties
who disagree (otherwise the parties would have settled out of court), leading to
a judge interpreting and applying the law to render a ruling. Given its
ubiquitous nature, judicial dispute-adjudication authority has to be identified in
terms of what it is not. International courts with dispute-adjudication authority
have a formal jurisdiction to “interpret the meaning of the law” in concrete
cases brought before them. A judge stays entirely in a dispute-adjudication role
when there is no question about the legal validity of the law itself, or about the
validity of a public actor’s action executing the law. Dispute adjudication is also
not enforcement when a public prosecutor is charging the defendant with
violations of the law.

12. MARTIN SHAPIRO, COURTS: A COMPARATIVE POLITICAL ANALYSIS 17–20 (1981).
13. This desire to hold state actors accountable in similar contractual terms as private actors is so
compelling that over time foreign sovereign immunity, a fundamental diplomatic courtesy, has been
compromised. Policies like that expressed in the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act of 1976, Pub. L. No.
94-583, 90 Stat. 2891 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.), have been passed to
revoke sovereign immunity with respect to commercial interactions. This Act has reverberated through
the international system, creating new doctrines that limit sovereign immunity. See MALCOLM N.
SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 628–38 (2003).
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Within this definition, domestic delegation of dispute-adjudication authority
is primarily other-binding delegation, and thus minimally sovereigntycompromising. Dispute adjudication does not require that a court’s jurisdiction
be compulsory. But since states are binding others—firms, citizens, et cetera—
they usually have no qualms about making the judge’s jurisdiction for this role
compulsory. Because delegation of dispute-adjudication authority is otherbinding, the interests of both the state and the judge are aligned. When there
are questions about the meaning of the law, the judge should be deferential to
the legislative body that wrote the law. Since both the judge and the state want
the parties to follow the law as it becomes legally defined, it is no surprise that
states lend their coercive mechanisms to the task of enforcing judicial decisions.
At the international level, however, delegation of the same type of authority
can be self-binding because a state’s public policies might themselves become
the subject of international judicial interpretation. Given that state policy might
be subject to review, governments have historically been ambivalent about
granting ICs compulsory jurisdiction in this role so as to be able to decide on a
case-by-case basis whether they will submit to legalized dispute adjudication.14
This ambivalence has been overcome it seems: increasingly, disputeadjudication authority is coupled with compulsory jurisdiction that turns an IC’s
dispute-adjudication role into a sort of decentralized enforcement role.15 With
compulsory jurisdiction, states may get a more usable international disputeadjudication system, one that is less easily blocked. But now the IC can be
ruling on cases where a state is an unwilling party, and thus unsurprisingly,
compliance with such rulings is more problematic. Compulsory dispute
adjudication thus differs fundamentally at the international level compared to
the domestic level primarily in that the interests of the state and of the IC are
not aligned—the losing state may not want to participate in legal proceedings
let alone comply, and since compliance is not per se in the interest of the noncomplying state (or other states in the system for that matter) there may not be
any coercive support to enforce a ruling.16
C. Delegation of Enforcement Authority to Courts
Although it is commonly said that courts “enforce the law,” it is always
states, with a monopoly on the legitimate use of force, that enforce the law by
punishing those who violate the law. States can enforce the rules on their own,
14. WERNER LEVI, LAW AND POLITICS IN THE INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 70–71 (1976).
15. The World Trade Organization (WTO) system, for example, explicitly blurs the line into an
enforcement role. The case starts as dispute resolution—both state parties pick panelists they prefer in
the hopes of finding a middle-ground resolution. But the case can end as enforcement, with the WTO’s
Dispute Settlement Body determining the extent of the damage caused by the violating country’s
behavior and authorizing the victim state to do what would be otherwise illegal—to construct a
purposely discriminatory and trade-diminishing barrier. For more on the WTO dispute-resolution
system, see JOHN H. BARTON ET AL., THE EVOLUTION OF THE TRADE REGIME 67–74 (2006).
16. Although compliance is more problematic, it is not necessarily true that ICs are therefore less
effective. Compliance is a poor indicator of effectiveness. See Kal Raustiala, Compliance and
Effectiveness in International Regulatory Cooperation, 32 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 387 (2000).
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using their extensive coercive power to punish those who violate their rules. In
a rule-of-law system, however, the task of overseeing the legitimate use of
coercive power is delegated to judges. In this “enforcement” role, the judge
essentially monitors the state’s use of its coercive power and thereby helps
convince the public that the state is not abusing its power.
For the enforcement role, a court is given jurisdiction over a body of law,
and a public prosecutor or enforcement body that charges a defendant with
violating the law brings cases before the judge. If the prosecutor manages to
convince the judge that the defendant violated the law, the judge can authorize
a public actor to do what would otherwise be illegal and illegitimate—to deny a
person his or her liberty, to seize his or her property, or to violate the law in
retaliation. Since guilty parties are unlikely to submit themselves voluntarily to
judicial proceedings about their behavior, enforcement roles require that courts
have compulsory jurisdiction.
At the domestic level, the judicial-enforcement role is largely other-binding
in the sense that defendants are likely to be private actors and judges are mainly
being asked to hold police accountable to following the rules legislative actors
set. But, delegating this role to judges is also self-binding to the extent that
states are subjecting their use of police powers to judicial oversight. States
minimize the sovereignty implication of this self-binding dimension by
controlling the prosecutor. Criminal courts rule on cases only at the
prosecutor’s request; victims are not allowed to trigger legal proceedings. By
making the prosecutorial office a political office, governments have a big say
over which cases are brought to court for review.
At the international level, there are two very different types of judicialenforcement roles. Criminal enforcement mimics its domestic counterpart—
there is a public prosecutor, the court has jurisdiction over an enumerated list of
crimes, and convicted criminals face prison terms. Clear examples in which
international criminal enforcement is delegated in an other-binding way include
victors’ justice war-crimes trials, and ad hoc international tribunals set up by the
UN Security Council (UNSC). These delegations are “other-binding” because
the states delegating authority to judges knew they would not themselves be
subject to the ad hoc criminal court’s jurisdiction. The International Criminal
Court (ICC) stands in sharp contrast, representing potentially self-binding
delegation since its jurisdictional reach is not limited geographically or (post2001) temporally. At the domestic level, the way to limit the sovereignty costs
of delegation is by political bodies influencing or controlling the prosecutor.
Appointment of international commissions or prosecutors can be influenced by
powerful states, and the UNSC can put a six-month stay on a prosecutorial
investigation. Moreover, the international prosecutor will need resources
(financial and informational) to investigate crimes and compile cases. By
withholding resources, rich states can greatly undermine the functioning of the
ICC system.
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A second international-enforcement role concerns law violations without
violence, wherein the stigmatizing term “criminal” is intentionally not used. In
the international context, one finds “infringement” mechanisms whereby an
international commission triggers a legal proceeding and the judge determines
if a state’s behavior is incompatible with the requirements of the treaty.
Both forms of delegated enforcement authority can be harder for a single
state to control at the international level, compared to the domestic level.
International prosecutorial bodies see it as their job to pursue legal violations.
Collectively, states are usually able to block prosecutions from proceeding.17 But
a single state may be unable to block a prosecutor or commission from
proceeding. Given the risk, international safeguards have been added to
international delegations of enforcement authority. For criminal enforcement,
an international prosecutor may not proceed with a case if a domestic court has
already given serious consideration to the crime. Thus, a state can escape ICC
authority by prosecuting the crime in the domestic legal system. States manage
international infringement authority by limiting the nature of the sanctions
associated with legal violations. Sometimes international bodies can levy a fine
or authorize financial retaliation against a state maintaining an illegal policy,
and other times the legal ruling itself is meant to evoke social opprobrium by
identifying an action as “illegal.” In both situations, review of infringements is
prospective—illegal behavior only becomes seriously costly should a state
persist in violating the law.
These political safeguards do not apply to the morphed role of decentralized
judicial enforcement. When international dispute resolution is coupled with
compulsory jurisdiction, dispute adjudication easily morphs into an
enforcement role that may actually be more sovereignty-compromising than
explicit delegations of enforcement authority. Prosecutors can be politically
dissuaded from raising a case, and their burden of proof is higher; they must
show beyond a reasonable doubt that a legal violation occurred. It can be
harder to dissuade a plaintiff-state from bringing a case than it is to dissuade an
international prosecutor, and the plaintiff-state need convince the judge only
that its interpretation of the law is correct, making the case perhaps harder to
stymie. Thus compulsory dispute adjudication may, along with delegation to the
ICC, represent the most sovereignty-compromising examples of ICs with
explicit and de facto enforcement roles.
D. Delegation of Administrative Review Authority to Courts
Administrative review is the main judicial means to hold the actors
implementing legislative policies accountable. This delegation is other-binding
in that the actors who write the law (legislatures) are using judges to monitor
17. For infringement proceedings, commissions are highly susceptible to political pressure. The
UNSC can block the ICC’s prosecutor from raising a case, but even without this formal block, it is
unlikely that a prosecutor will pursue a case when there is significant transnational political opposition
to doing so.
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the actors that implement the law (administrators, or “the government”). The
administrative-review logic tells judges to be deferential to the legislative body
and to defer to the will of the legislative body over that of the public
administrator as they interpret and apply the law. 18
One can recognize a court with administrative-review authority from its
jurisdiction. Courts with the authority to hear cases regarding the legality of a
government action, policy, or regulation, or to hear “actions to annul” or
“failure to act” charges regarding decisions or nondecisions of public
implementers of the law, have administrative-review powers. Administrativereview courts have compulsory jurisdiction and private access so the actors
affected by government decisionmaking can challenge arbitrary decisions.
Administrative-court rulings generally do not substitute a specific judicial
decision for the contested administrative decision; rather, they remand the case
back to the administration so that it can try again to make a decision that will
not be rejected by the court. Thus administrative review tends to be a fire-alarm
system of oversight, akin to Bradley and Kelley’s category of delegation-ofoversight authority.19
Administrative review differs from constitutional review in that judges are
not ruling on the validity of the law itself, but rather on whether a particular
government decision or policy is congruent with the law, or whether the policy
has been implemented in accordance with the law, or both. Admittedly a fine
line separates constitutional and administrative review, and in political systems
in which all courts feel free to practice constitutional review, the lines can
become quite blurred. But the difference between administrative and
constitutional review has also been made distinct in both domestic and
international contexts. 20
There can be great variation in the extent of administrative check created
through administrative review. Some administrative-review systems have a
narrow standard of review where courts check only that proper procedure was
followed or that the decision was not “arbitrary and capricious” in its
application to the litigant, or both. This narrow standard of review tells courts
to grant administrators significant deference in how they interpret and apply
rules. Some standards of review are broad, with judges checking the facts and

18. This conceptualization of administrative review is consistent with the argument made by Barry
Weingast and Mark Moran, and by Christopher Edley who gives as a subtitle to his book “rethinking
judicial control of bureaucracy.” See CHRISTOPHER EDLEY, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: RETHINKING
JUDICIAL CONTROL OF BUREAUCRACY (1990); Barry R. Weingast & Mark J. Moran, Bureaucratic
Discretion or Congressional Control? Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission, 91 J.
POL. ECON. 765 (1983).
19. Bradley & Kelley, supra note 6, at 22. Kal Rausiala makes a similar argument. See Kal
Raustiala, Police Patrols & Fire Alarms in the NAAEC, 3 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 389 (2004).
20. In the United States, Italy, and to some extent Germany, all courts feel empowered to reject
laws that judges deem unconstitutional. In these systems, supreme constitutional courts serve primarily
as appellate bodies. But many national systems maintain a strong distinction between administrative
and constitutional review. These systems, as in France, only allow constitutional courts to conduct
constitutional review.
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the interpretations of rules to see if the administrator made the correct
decision.21 The broader the standard of review, and the harder it is to change
laws underpinning administrative rules, the greater the sovereignty costs
associated with administrative-review authority.
International administrative review is in large part the “other-binding” tool
of divided government that one finds in the domestic realm. When ICs are
reviewing only the decisions of international institutions—like the Seabed
Authority, the Andean General Secretariat, the General Secretary of the
Common Market of Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), or the
European Commission (EC)—international delegation of administrative-review
authority is not sovereignty-compromising even when coupled with private
access so that the subjects of IO (international organization) administrative
decisionmaking can challenge IO decisions. But international administrative
review can also be sovereignty-compromising. The main implementers of
international regulatory law are states, not international organizations.
Examples of ICs’ explicitly granted review authority over domestic
administrations include the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
Chapter 19 panels (which are not permanent international courts). These are,
by design, intended to review whether American, Canadian, and Mexican
administrations and administrative courts have made correct decisions in
subsidy and anti-dumping cases. The European Court of Justice (ECJ) and
Andean Tribunal of Justice (ATJ) were also, from inception, designed to review
decisions of supranational administrative actors and whether national
administrators were implementing common policies correctly.22 Delegation in
these contexts was meant to both help implement complex international rules,
and reassure other states that countries would not practice favoritism or
undermine the meaning of their commitments during implementation. Explicit
grants of international administrative-review authority tend to be coupled with
private access, even though wider access rules can make delegation more
sovereignty-compromising because they limit state latitude in interpreting legal
rules.
E. Delegation of Constitutional-Review Authority
Although the rule of law requires that governments (like private actors) be
held accountable to law, it does not require checks on law-making power.
Indeed, philosophers like Thomas Hobbes and Jean Jacques Rousseau

21. Christopher Edley discusses how standards of review can vary. See Edley, supra note 18, at 96–
129.
22. Indeed the ECJ’s innovative preliminary-review mechanism was created for this purpose—to
allow challenges to the implementation of European rules that were raised in domestic courts to be
channeled to the ECJ for review. See Pierre Pescatore, Les travaux du “Groupe Juridique” dans la
négociation des Traités de Rome, 34 STUDIA DIPLOMATICA 172 (1981).
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considered any check on sovereign power to be inherently problematic.23
Political systems embodying this view include the United Kingdom, which has
no constitution and no constitutional court, though it is certainly a “rule of law”
country. Other philosophers (like John Locke)24 believed that sovereign power
ends up being exercised better when it is subject to checks and balances. Those
who believe in checks and balances create constitutional political systems with
constitutional-review mechanisms. Constitutional-review authority entails the
power to nullify laws and policies that contradict the constitution. Committing
to constitutional review is both a self-binding precommitment on the part of the
legislature, and an other-binding choice made to bind future legislative actors
and units within the political system to the constitutional bargain.25
Like
administrative-reviewand
criminal-enforcement
authority,
constitutional-review authority can work only when the court’s jurisdiction is
compulsory. Unlike administrative review, constitutional review does not
require private access. Indeed, in France, constitutional review exists without
any right of private actors to instigate review. Delegation of constitutionalreview authority is always sovereignty-compromising and by design, it shifts
power away from those with majority control of the political apparatus so as to
provide a check against majority rule.26
We can recognize an intentional delegation of constitutional-review
authority to international courts through the grant of jurisdiction to nullify laws.
As in the national realm, the delegation reveals an intent to limit what the
international institutions can do in the future. The European Union (EU), the
Andean Community, and the Common Market of Eastern and Southern Africa
have political bodies that are, in essence, legislative bodies capable of creating
rules, policies, and even laws that are directly binding on member states. The
international courts in these political systems (the ECJ, the ATJ, and the
COMESA court) were explicitly empowered to hear challenges to the collective
decisions raised by member states or private actors. In these cases, raised either
directly or for some ICs referred from a national court, the IC determines
whether acts taken by these legislative actors are ultra vires (exceeding the
authority of the bodies).27 If a law were ultra vires, it would be nullified. In this
example, states are self-binding against their own potential desire to use an
international body expansively. Since European laws can be created based on

23. See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN; OR, THE MATTER, FORME AND POWER OF A COMMON
WEALTH, ECCLESIASTICALL AND CIVIL (1962); JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU & HENRY JOHN TOZER,
THE SOCIAL CONTRACT, OR, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL RIGHT (Henry John Tozer, trans., 1905).
24. See John Locke, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT AND A LETTER CONCERNING
TOLERATION (1956).
25. ELSTER, supra note 8, at 115–18.
26. For more on the variety of constitutional delegations, see SWEET, supra note 10, at 47.
27. Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, Dec. 16, 2004, 2004 O.J. (C310) 1; Treaty
Creating the Court of Justice of the Cartagena Agreement ch. III, May 28, 1979, 18 I.L.M 1203; Treaty
Establishing the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa art. 26, Nov. 5, 1993, 33 I.L.M. 1067.
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qualified majority voting, supranational constitutional review can also be a
means for the minority to challenge decisions of the majority.28
In the above examples, supranational constitutional-review authority does
not necessarily compromise national sovereignty, so long as the court is
reviewing the validity of supranational rules. But, international courts have also
assumed a sovereignty-compromising constitutional authority to review the
compatibility of national and international rules. Legal scholars call the
phenomenon the “constitutionalization” of an international treaty, by which
they mean that the treaty is elevated to a sort of constitutional (supreme) status
by the rulings of the court. The ECJ’s declaration of the supremacy of
European law (mimicked by the ATJ) was one such constitutionalizing act
because it gave the ECJ the de facto authority to render national rules that
conflict with European laws inapplicable.29 Some see the creation of the WTO
(World Trade Organization), and the WTO appellate body’s jurisprudence, as
constitutionalizing the WTO Treaty because it makes incompatible national
laws too costly to maintain (though others disagree because countries can
accept retaliation instead of changing conflicting laws).30 Design changes
undertaken and under discussion regarding the European Court of Human
Rights (ECHR) have, according to some scholars, increasingly turned the
ECHR into a supranational constitutional court that reviews the compatibility
of national laws and practices with European human-rights rules.31
Constitutionalization of international treaties represents a case in which a
court expands its initial authority and in doing so compromises national
sovereignty. Whether constitutionalizing acts of ICs have the intended effect
depends mostly on the reaction of the country whose policy is condemned. In
many countries, governments are bound to international law, but there is no
corresponding domestic rule or legislation to make international law, or IC
rulings, binding within the national system. If governments choose to change
“illegal” policies, or if IC decisions that rule national policies illegal have no

28. Germany, for example, challenged the EU’s Banana Protocol, which was passed despite its
objections. Karen J. Alter & Sophie Meunier, Banana Splits: Nested and Competing Regimes in the
Transatlantic Banana Trade Dispute, 13 J. EUR. PUB. POL’Y 362, 367 (2007).
29. Joseph Weiler, The Transformation of Europe, 100 YALE L.J. 2403, 2416–19 (1991). See also
Eric Stein, Lawyers, Judges and the Making of a Transnational Constitution, 75 AM. J. INT’L L. 1
(1981). The equivalent ATJ ruling is Andean Tribunal of Justice Interpretaciones Prejudiciales 1 IP
87,
available
at
http://www.comunidadandina.org/canprocedimientosinternet/interpretacion_
prejudicial.htm (last visited Feb. 7, 2008).
30. Petersmann believes the AB’s jurisprudence has constitutionalized the WTO, while John
Jackson and Jeffrey Dunoff disagree. See Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Constitutional Conceits: The WTO’s
‘Constitution’ and the Discipline of International Law, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 647 (2006); JOHN H.
JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: CONSTITUTION AND JURISPRUDENCE (1998); ErnstUlrich Petersmann, The Transformation of the World Trading System Through the 1994 Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, 6 EUR. J. INT’L L. 161 (1995).
31. Laurence R. Helfer, Redesigning the European Court of Human Rights: From International
Tribunal to Constitutional Court, Presentation at the NYU Law School Colloquium on Compliance
with International Human Rights (Jan. 29, 2007).
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national effect, in fact there may be no compromise of national sovereignty. If,
however, national governments do not act but their courts accept an
international decision as authoritative within the domestic realm, the
international legal ruling can have a constitutional effect in the domestic system.
F. The Fundamental Risk of Delegation to Courts
This Part has defined four roles that courts play in the international political
system. For some roles the authors of both the law and the delegation contract
are binding others—using courts to help ensure that other actors (police,
national administrations, private actors) follow the rules they created. Otherbinding delegation is based on efficiency logic—states are using the legal
process to monitor compliance with the law, expending their coercive resources
only when a legal ruling on its own is insufficient to induce compliance. Selfbinding delegation, on the other hand, is based on credibility-enhancement
logic. Whenever publics might be suspicious of self-serving interpretations of
the law by public actors, governments and legislatures can gain credibility by
entrusting the interpretation of the rules to independent courts.32 But it is likely
impossible to make a delegation wholly other-binding. In making courts the
keeper of “the law,” governments create a rival body with the authority to say
what the law means, and in exchange governments perhaps get some credibility
as being committed to a rule of law. The key distinction is whether delegation to
courts will be primarily other-binding in that it is mostly other actors—private
actors, or state interlocutors—that will be subject to the decisions of courts.
Table 1 below summarizes which delegations to courts tend to be primarily selfbinding or other-binding, examining the domestic context separately from the
international context. The international column shows that delegation can be
designed to be both other-binding and self-binding. It is an empirical question
whether specific delegations to ICs in practice end up more self-binding or
other-binding.
If one compares the domestic and international columns of Table 1, it is
clear that delegating the exact same tasks involves a greater sovereignty risk
internationally than it does domestically. Here the limits of a domestic analogy
are evident; diplomats making assumptions about ICs based on their knowledge
of domestic courts may end up with unintended outcomes. But, regardless of
whether a judicial role is primarily other-binding or mostly self-binding,
delegation to courts involves a risk that judges will interpret the law differently
than governments or legislative bodies might want, and a risk that judicial roles
will morph over time. These risks are more problematic at the international
level because international rules are very hard to rewrite, making legal rulings
harder to reverse, and because any finding against a national law inevitably
strikes at the heart of national sovereignty. Of course this is the whole point of

32. The differences in logic is explained further in Karen J. Alter, Agent or Trustee: International
Courts in Their Political Context, 14 EUR. J. INT’L REL. 33 (2008).
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international judicial review—to make it more costly for a country to defend
the legitimacy of policies labeled “illegal” by an authoritative international legal
body.
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Table 1: The Four Judicial Roles Compared
Judicial Role

Dispute
Adjudication

Criminal
Enforcement

Administrative
Review

Constitutional
Review

When combined
with compulsory
jurisdiction,
dispute
adjudication
becomes
contract
enforcement.

Compulsory
jurisdiction;

Compulsory
jurisdiction;

Compulsory
jurisdiction;

prosecutor
initiates case.

private actor
initiates case.

access rules can
vary.

Functional
Role

Judge applies
state’s law to
resolve a dispute
between private
actors, or
between public
and private
actors, radiating
state social
control into
private-law
disputes.

Judge ensures
that public
authorities have
reasonable
evidence and
grounds for
punishing those
who violate the
law, granting a
legal
imprimatur to
state exercise of
coercive
authority.

Judge oversees
public
administrators to
ensure their
decisions were
made following
proper
procedure,
consistent with
the requirements
of the law, and
are not arbitrary
or capricious.

Judge helps
check that
legislative actors
do not exceed
their
constitutional
authority,
holding
governments
and legislatures
accountable to
constitutional
bargain.

How we know
it when we see
it

Jurisdiction to
interpret the law
in concrete cases
raised before it.
No explicit
authority to
review the
validity of the
law, or of public
acts. Cases are
raised by
disputants, not
by public,
prosecutor-type
actors.

Jurisdiction in
cases brought
by public
prosecutors or
commission
regarding an
enumerated list
of crimes or a
set of rules.

Jurisdiction in
cases concerning
the legality of
any
administrative
actor’s
regulatory
decision, or
administrative
actor’s “failure
to act.”

Jurisdiction to
review the
validity of any
legal rule of an
IO, of a national
government, or
of both.
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Dispute
Adjudication

Criminal
Enforcement

Administrative
Review

Constitutional
Review

Who is bound
by delegation
to domestic
courts

Primarily otherbinding.

Primarily otherbinding.

Other-binding.

Primarily selfbinding.

Legislative body
binds public and
private actors to
judicial
interpretation of
rules set by the
legislative body.

Legislator is
creating
oversight
mechanisms for
police forces.

Who is bound
by delegation
to
international
courts

Self-binding

Other-binding
in the case of ad
hoc criminal
courts—the
states creating
ad hoc courts
usually do not
fall under the
court’s
jurisdiction.

in the sense that
governments
and in some
cases
legislatures are
held
accountable to
their
international
commitments.

Self-binding
when all states
fall under
court’s
jurisdiction.

Legislature is
binding
administrative
agencies to
follow their
rules.

Other-binding
when states are
binding IOs to
follow
international
rules.
Self-binding
when ICs
oversee
domestic
application of
international
rules.

Constitution
creates absolute
limits on
legislative
authority.

Primarily otherbinding
whenever ICs
assess whether
international
acts are ultra
vires.
Self-binding
whenever ICs
can assess the
compatibility of
national rules
with
international
rules. Legal
impact of an IC
ruling will be
determined in
large part by
domestic
system.
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Dispute
Adjudication

Criminal
Enforcement

Administrative
Review

Constitutional
Review

Noncompulsory
dispute
adjudication
assures that
parties cannot
be brought to
court
unwillingly.

By controlling
the prosecutor,
and the flow of
resources and
information to
the prosecutor,
governments
can influence
the extent of
judicial
oversight.

A narrow
standard of
review (for
example,
limiting review
to procedural
issues or to the
issue of whether
the decision was
arbitrary and
capricious) will
limit judicial
oversight.

Limiting access
for
constitutional
challenges will
limit the
opportunities
courts have to
rule a law or
practice
unconstitutional.

States can also
exempt certain
state actions
from review.

States can also
attach weak
sanctions to
adverse IC
rulings, to
lessen the costs
of losing an
enforcement
case.

The discussion above identified a number of ways in which authors of the
delegation contract can influence the likelihood that sovereignty will be
compromised, meaning that states will find themselves bound by judicial
interpretation. States can create restrictions on who can bring cases, on the
types of legal arguments that can be raised, and on whether and how sanctions
are associated with a finding of a legal violation. Dispute adjudication can be
noncompulsory, requiring both parties to consent before a case proceeds to
court. Prosecutors can be tightly controlled to limit the extent of enforcement
delegation. Although administrative delegation requires compulsory
jurisdiction and private access, legislators can create broad or narrow standards
of review and broad or narrow rules of standing to bring a case. Access can be
limited in constitutional review, thereby limiting the number and types of cases
that can be raised. Finally, public actors can be exempted from certain types of
legal challenges (for example, sitting government officials can be exempt, or
states can be exempt from cases involving national security).
The differences in sovereignty costs domestically and internationally are
captured graphically in Diagram 1, which also highlights some of the ways in
which sovereignty costs are regulated. Note that the sovereignty costs are only
“potential” costs—usage of the court combined with the willingness of judges to
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assert their authority will determine the extent to which delegation actually
becomes sovereignty-compromising.
Diagram 1: Sovereignty Costs Associated With Role Choices in Delegation to
Courts
Domestic
Delegation

Lower
Sovereignty
Costs
International
Delegation

Dispute
adjudication.
Administrative
review with
narrow standard
of review.

Criminal
enforcement
controlled via
prosecutor.

Administrative
review—broad
standard of
review.

Constitutionalreview authority.

Higher
Sovereignty
Costs
Noncompulsory
dispute
adjudication.
Ad hoc criminal
enforcement.
Administrative
review of IO
outputs.

Constitutional
review of IO
outputs.

IO with
infringement
authority (IO
prosecutor
controllable;
limited
sanctions
associated
with legal
rulings).

Administrative
review of
national actors
implementing
international
rules.

Compulsory dispute
adjudication (can
morph into a
decentralized
enforcement role).
International
criminal court.
“Constitutionalized”
international legal
system.

This diagram contrasts to some extent with the diagram in this symposium’s
introduction in which the function of the judicial roles—the monitoring of
administrative and enforcement roles, and the adjudication of a disputeadjudication role—are seen as relatively sovereignty-compromising compared
to policy implementation or research and advice roles.33 The difference is that I
do not see binding others as per se sovereignty-compromising—especially if the
“others” being bound are international as opposed to domestic actors.
III
DELEGATION TO INTERNATIONAL COURTS: THE EMPIRICAL RECORD34
This Part assesses the empirical record in delegating the four roles to ICs.
Table 2 below lists the existing ICs that meet PICT’s definition of an
international court, organized by the year they were established.35 The table
indicates whether the court has compulsory jurisdiction, whether private actors
have access so as to initiate litigation, and the number of cases the court has
litigated. Where courts existed before 1990, the table breaks out the judicial
activity since then. The PICT definition is stringent, requiring that a court be
permanent to count as an IC. This table would be longer if it included quasijudicial bodies or legal bodies that are not permanent (like NAFTA). Also

33. Bradley & Kelley, supra note 6, at 21, fig. 3.
34. This Part draws on material previously published in Alter, supra note 3.
35. See supra note 1 for PICT’s definition. The year the treaty was signed is the year the court was
established. Often courts were not created until a threshold number of states ratified the court treaty,
thus there is a gap between the date of establishment and the date of creation.
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missing from the table are seven African courts,36 which mimic in design their
European counterparts but which exist mostly on paper. If African courts were
added in, along with legal bodies that are functionally equivalent to permanent
courts, the trends discussed below would mainly be reinforced; there would be
more delegation of administrative, enforcement, and constitutional roles to
international legal bodies, and more often than not these international judicial
bodies would have compulsory jurisdiction and allow private actors to initiate
litigation.
Table 2: International Courts, By Date Established
International
Courts

Date
Established/
Created

Compulsory
Jurisdiction

International
Court of
Justice (ICJ)

1945/1946

Optional
37
Protocol

European
Court of
Justice (ECJ)

1952/1952

X

PrivateActor
Access

X

Total Cases
(last year
included in
figures)

Total Cases
Since 1990
(primarily
until 2006)

111
contentions
cases filed, 80
judgments, 20
advisory
opinions
(2006).

50 cases filed,
30 judgments,
4 advisory
opinions
(2006).

5765 cases
referred by
national
courts, 7908
direct
actions, 822
appeals, 342
applications
for interim
measures,
and 2860
infringements
(2006).

3769 cases
referred by
national
courts, 3248
direct actions,
822 appeals,
81
applications
for interim
measures, and
1943
infringements
(2006).

36. Not included because of a lack of information are the Instance Judiciare of the Arab Maghreb
Union, the Court of Justice of the East African Community, the Court of Justice of the Central African
Economic and Monetary Community, the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, the African
Court of Justice, the Court of Justice of the Economic Community of West African States, and the
Tribunal of the Southern African Development Community. For more on these courts, see the website
for the African International Courts and Tribunals, http://www.aict-ctia.org (last visited Feb. 7, 2008).
37. Courts that lack general compulsory jurisdiction usually have optional protocols which states
can sign to commit to compulsory jurisdiction among signatory states.
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Court of
Human Rights
(ECHR)

1950/1959

Benelux Court
(BCJ)

1965/1974

X

X
(as of 1998)

X

Via national
court*
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12,310 cases
deemed
admissible;
7528
judgments
(2006).

11,640 cases
deemed
admissible;
7323
judgments
(2006).

137
preliminary
references
filed (10
rejected)

42 preliminary
references
(2006).

(2006).
Commission
is a
gatekeeper.

162
judgments, 19
advisory
opinions, and
245 orders
for
provisional
measures
(2006).

153
judgments, 9
advisory
opinions, and
243 orders for
provisional
measures
(2006).

X

X

25
nullifications,
79
infringement
cases, and
1163
preliminary
rulings
(2006).

22
nullifications,
78
infringement
cases, and
1152
preliminary
rulings (2006).

1980/1980

So qualified
as to be
meaningless.

By optional
state
consent.

2 cases
(1999).

**

1982/1996

Limited
compulsory
jurisdiction;
Optional
Protocol.

Seabed
authority
and seizing
of vessels
only.

14 judgments (2006).

InterAmerican
Court of
Human Rights
(IACHR)

1969/1979

Andean
Tribunal of
Justice (ATJ)

1979/1984

Judicial
Tribunal for
Organization
of Arab
PetroleumExporting
Countries
(OAPEC)
International
Tribunal for
the Law of the
Seas (ITLOS)

Optional
Protocol
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European
Court of First
Instance (CFI)

1988/1988

X

X

5227 cases completed from
6256 cases filed (2006).

Central
American
Court of
Justice
(CACJ)

1991/1992

X

X

78 cases, 23 advisory opinions,
and 55 rulings (2006).

European Free
Trade Area
Court
(EFTAC)

1992/1995

X

Economic
Court of the
CommonWealth of
Independent
States
(ECCIS)

1992/1993

X

Court of
Justice for the
Common
Market of
Eastern and
Southern
Africa
(COMESA)

1993/1998

X

X

5 judgments, 2 orders (2006).

Common
Court of
Justice and
Arbitration for
the
Organization
for the
Harmonization
of Corporate
Law in Africa
(OHADA)

1993/1997

X

X

6 opinions, 111 rulings (2006).

International
Criminal
Tribunal for
the former
Yugoslavia
(ICTY)

1993/1993

X

(some
exceptions)

Via national
courts.

59

90 opinions (2006).

83 decisions and opinions
(2006).

73 public indictments, 31
completed cases, 46 judgments
by the Trial Chambers, and 24
judgments by the Appeals
Chamber (2006).
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General
Agreement on
Tariffs and
Trade
(GATT);

1953/1993

World Trade
Organization
Appellate
Body (WTO)

1994/1995

International
Criminal
Tribunal for
Rwanda
(ICTR)

[Vol. 71:37

229 cases, 98 rulings from
GATT era.
X

357 disputes formally initiated,
79 appellate rulings, 192 panel
reports in WTO era (2006;
2005 for panel reports).

1994/1995

X

27 cases in progress, 27
completed cases, 7 awaiting
trial (2006).

International
Criminal
Court (ICC)

1998/2002

X

4 situations under
investigation; six warrants for
arrest issued (2007).

Caribbean
Court of
Justice (CCJ)

2001/2005

X

Began operation April 2005.

International
Criminal
Tribunal for
Sierra Leone
(ICTSL)

2002/2002

X

13 indictments proceeding; 2
withdrawn due to death (2006).

Total
International
Judicial
Activity

38,995
admissible
cases filed.

30,311

Complete
Cases Only

33,057
completed
decisions,
opinions, or
rulings.

24,863
completed
decisions,
opinions, or
rulings.

admissible
cases filed.

1

The data was compiled by author, based on visiting the websites of the international courts
and consulting scholarship as available. Bibliography available from the author. This table does
not include labor cases involving disputes with employees of IOs or contempt of court
decisions. Courts are constantly changing how they report usage; thus one can find
discrepancies over time.
* = no cases
** = data not available. Figures exclude staff cases.
2

The GATT system changed significantly, going from a quasi-legal body to meeting PICT’s
definition of an IC.
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Table 2 shows a proliferation in the number of ICs and in international
litigation since 1990. Although other issues, like security, can be litigated before
the ICJ—a general-jurisdiction court—the delegation pattern reveals that states
have greatest comfort in delegating to ICs the interpretation of trade
commitments and human-rights issues, including war crimes. Table 2 also shows
a change in the design of courts over time. European courts account for the
majority of international legal outputs. Usually the usage rates by European
courts are attributed in part to the design of European courts—European courts
have compulsory jurisdiction, and private actors can initiate disputes.38 Table 2
paints a picture of ICs increasingly resembling the European design model of
compulsory jurisdiction and private access. Twelve ICs allow private parties to
initiate legal suits against state actors. Six allow nonstate actors—international
commissions or prosecutors—to initiate disputes against state actors. The last
two columns of data support the notion that ICs with compulsory jurisdiction
and nonstate-actor access hear more cases,39 but it also shows that not all ICs
with compulsory jurisdiction and private-access ICs are equally active.
In fact, much of the design trend can be explained by the roles delegated to
ICs. Table 3 below summarizes my findings on roles delegated to ICs, and on
the design of the ICs for the given role. These classifications are based on an
analysis of the Court Treaties defining the jurisdiction and design of the IC. To
categorize a court, I looked for the grant of jurisdiction identified in the first
column. For example, to be classified as having administrative-review authority,
a court needed explicit jurisdiction in cases regarding the “legality of any action,
directive or decision” of a public administrative actor (which often included
authority to hear appeals for nonaction). Note that most ICs have been
delegated more than one role, with each role defined in separate treaty articles.
The rules regarding compulsory jurisdiction and access can also vary by role.
For example, the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) has an
interstate dispute-resolution role that lacks compulsory jurisdiction. ITLOS also
has an administrative-review role with respect to the Seabed Authority for
which it has compulsory jurisdiction, and access for private litigants.40 The
results are as follows.

38. E.g., Alvarez, supra note 2, at 425–27; Laurence Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a
Theory of Effective Supranational Adjudication, 107 YALE L.J. 273, 288–91 (1997).
39. Robert Keohane et al., Legalized Dispute Resolution: Interstate and Transnational, 54 INT’L
ORG. 457, 474 (2000).
40. John E. Noyes, The International Tribunal for the Law of the Seas, 32 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 109,
118–26, 133–35, 138 (1998).

02__ALTER.DOC

62

6/9/2008 8:01:32 AM

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 71:37

Table 3: Delegation of Different Roles to ICs41
Judicial Role

ICs With This Role
(See Table 2 for full court
names.)

Dispute Adjudication
General jurisdiction to “interpret
the meaning of the law” or to
“ensure that the law is respected”
Enforcement
Jurisdiction regarding an
enumerated list of crimes or
jurisdiction to hear infringement
suits against states. Cases
generally are raised by a publicprosecutorial type actor.
Administrative Review
Jurisdiction in cases concerning
the “legality of any action,
regulation, directive, or decision”
of a public actor, or the public
actor’s “failure to act.”
Constitutional Review
Jurisdiction to review the validity
of any legislative act, regulation,
or directive of an IO.

Percent of Total ICs
Explicitly Delegated
This Role (n=20)

ATJ*, BCJ, CACJ*, CCJ,
COMESA, ECCIS, ECJ,
EFTAC, ICJ, ITLOS,
OAPEC, OHADA*, WTO

13/20

ATJ*, CACJ*, COMESA,
ECHR*, ECJ, EFTAC,
IACHR, ICC, ICTY, ICTR,
ICTSL

11/20

ATJ*, BCJ*, CACJ*, CFI*,
COMESA*, ECJ*, EFTAC*,
ITLOS*

8/20

65%

55%

40%

ATJ*, CACJ*, COMESA*,
ECJ*
CCJ*?

4/20
20% (possibly 30%)

Post 1998 ECHR*?

Courts in bold have compulsory jurisdiction associated with the role.
Courts with a * have private access associated with the role.

A. International Delegation of Dispute-Adjudication Authority
At first glance, delegation of dispute-adjudication authority appears to be
the most common form of delegation to ICs. But this appearance may mainly be
a result of the “catch-all” nature of dispute adjudication—the fact that the other
three roles need explicit definitions of jurisdiction or design elements to be
classified in the role. Indeed, if one labeled as “decentralized enforcement
mechanisms” all dispute-resolution mechanisms with compulsory jurisdiction,
then enforcement would be the most prevalent role delegated to ICs (see the
discussion of delegation of enforcement authority that follows).

41. Based on the author’s coding. Please contact the author for more information about this
coding.
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The ICJ is the oldest IC on Table 2, and from inception it has served as a
default international dispute-adjudication body, meaning that many treaties
designate the ICJ as the dispute-adjudication body rather than create a new
body for the specific treaty. The ICJ lacks compulsory jurisdiction, but there is
an optional protocol whereby states can commit to compulsory jurisdiction42 and
countries can decide à la carte to make the ICJ’s jurisdiction compulsory for
specific treaties.43 Thus, the ICJ’s lack of compulsory jurisdiction is not per se a
reason not to rely on the ICJ. But the ICJ is a general-jurisdiction body, with
judges who could come from anywhere in the world. Although litigants have the
option of appointing ad hoc judges for a specific case, if an agreement involves
substance that requires specific expertise and pertains to only a handful of
countries, the ICJ’s general design may make it unattractive. Indeed, all of the
other ICs with dispute-adjudication roles either cover more specific issues,
include only a small group of states, or both, suggesting that these courts were
created with the intent that they have a narrower, more-specialized jurisdiction
than the ICJ.
It appears that states are increasingly abandoning the ICJ model of
noncompulsory dispute adjudication. The new ITLOS court and the
Organization of Arab Petroleum-Exporting Countries (OAPEC) court lack
compulsory jurisdiction, but every other dispute-adjudication body has been
given compulsory jurisdiction. Why have states agreed to a more sovereigntycompromising delegation of international dispute-adjudication authority? An
analysis of which ICs have compulsory jurisdiction suggests an answer. States
appear to make dispute adjudication compulsory primarily in economic
agreements: seven of the ICs with compulsory authority are part of trade
unions,44 and two others handle primarily corporate investment disputes.45 Of
course, not all economic agreements have international dispute-resolution
mechanisms, let alone mechanisms with compulsory jurisdiction. Analyzing
trade agreements, James McCall Smith found that trade unions are more likely
to be associated with compulsory dispute-adjudication compared to free-trade
zones. McCall Smith reasons that the desire to capture the benefits of trade is
driving decisions about the type of dispute-adjudication mechanism chosen.46
Indeed, the concentration of dispute-resolution mechanisms with compulsory
jurisdiction in economic agreements suggests that states especially want
42. Sixty-two states (out of 191 United Nations members) have agreed to the ICJ’s compulsory
jurisdiction, though thirteen limit their assent to issues other than cases arising from belligerent action.
43. This is how the United States came to withdraw twice from the ICJ’s compulsory jurisdiction—
first from the ICJ’s general compulsory jurisdiction, and second with respect to the Vienna Convention
on Consular Relations.
44. The World Trade Organization’s Appellate Body, the Andean Community, the European
Union, the European Free Trade Area, the East and South African Common Market, the Caribbean
Community, and the Benelux Community.
45. The Economic Court of the Commonwealth of Independent States and the Court for the
Harmonization of Corporate Law in Africa.
46. James McCall Smith, The Politics of Dispute Settlement Design, 54 INT’L ORG. 137, 145–50
(2000).
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economic commitments to be enforceable. Having these agreements enforced
through interstate dispute resolution, as opposed to private actors or an
international-commission litigation, helps ensure that only cases the member
parties really care about are litigated. When dispute-resolution agreements
allow for suspending trade access as remedy (the Andean Community and
WTO), reciprocity becomes the main force for compliance.
Only three out of the thirteen ICs with dispute-resolution authority also
allow private access for this role. These cases appear to be designed to allow
relatively small disputes to be handled outside of diplomatic channels. The
Common Court of Justice and Arbitration for the Organization of the
Harmonization of Corporate Law in Africa (OHADA) is mainly an appeals
body for national rulings applying common corporate laws and regulations;
allowing private actors to appeal national court rulings creates a nondiplomatic
outlet to handle investor disputes.47 The ITLOS generally lacks compulsory
jurisdiction, but it has compulsory jurisdiction for disputes involving the seizing
of vessels48 and for contractual disputes between private actors and the Seabed
Authority, perhaps so these issues do not become diplomatic controversies. The
exception to both arguments above is the Central American Court of Justice
(CACJ). It is a general-jurisdiction court pertaining to the countries of Costa
Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua; its jurisdiction is
compulsory; and private actors can raise cases.49
Although dispute adjudication may be a prevalent role delegated to ICs, it is
not per se the most-important or most-frequently activated international
judicial role. It is hard to assess what percentage of each court’s docket actually
involves dispute adjudication. The most active ICs with this role—the ECJ and
ATJ—break down the type of legal case by how the case was referred, creating
categories of preliminary rulings cases (cases referred by national courts),
infringement suits raised by the Commission or Secretariat, nullification suits
(administrative review of IO outputs), and direct actions (cases raised directly
in front of the IC). There appear to be very few straight-up interstate disputeadjudication cases in the ECJ and ATJ. This is not really surprising. Disputeadjudication cases may reach the IC as infringement suits, with states asking the
Commission or Secretariat to pursue the issue instead of bringing a case
themselves. The other dispute-adjudication courts are rarely used—with the
notable exception of the WTO.50
47. NAFTA has similar provisions for investor disputes. See, e.g., North American Free Trade
Agreement, U.S.–Can.–Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 605, 639. NAFTA is not on Table 1 because its
legal bodies are not permanent.
48. The owner of the boat may bring the suit, but the plaintiff’s government must first consent for
the case to go forward. Noyes, supra note 40, at 123.
49. For more information on the CACJ, see Project on International Courts and Tribunals, Central
American Court of Justice, http://www.pict-pcti.org/courts/CACJ.html (last visited Feb. 7, 2008).
50. The lack of large dispute-adjudication case loads—with the notable exception of the WTO—
may reflect a bias in the data. If most international disputes are dealt with through alternative-disputeresolution bodies—via arbitration, diplomacy, or legalized dispute resolution undertaken by courts that
are not permanent or that deal with private-actor disputes only—my reliance on PICT’s categorization
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B. International Delegation of Enforcement Authority
The enforcement role involves public prosecutors bringing criminal or
infringement suits against states or their agents (government administrative
actors or government officials). Fifty-five percent of ICs (eleven of twenty) have
been delegated explicit enforcement roles. Delegation of enforcement roles are
found in the three central areas of IC authority—international criminal law,
trade law, and human-rights law. In Part II of this article, I argued that
compulsory dispute adjudication can easily morph into a decentralized
enforcement role, in which aggrieved states rather than central prosecutors
bring suits to enforce the international agreement.51 If ICs with compulsory
dispute-adjudication authority but no international prosecutor to help enforce
the agreement (for example, the WTO,52 the Economic Court of the CommonWealth of Independent States (ECCIS),53 the Benelux Court of Justice (BCJ),
and the Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ)) were included, the number of ICs
created with some enforcement role in mind would expand to seventy-five
percent of all ICs.
At the international level, delegation of enforcement authority can become
self-binding in principle and thus bring sovereignty risks. But a deeper look at
the record of delegation shows that eight of the eleven delegations were
designed to minimize risk. For two ICs, delegation of enforcement authority
was coupled with political-control mechanisms: Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights (IAHCR) countries can opt out of the court’s compulsory
jurisdiction and pressure the Commission not to pursue a case; for the
COMESA court, a council of states must sign off before an infringement suit
can be brought. Three of the delegations of enforcement powers are otherbinding delegations to ad hoc criminal courts (Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and Sierra
Leone Tribunals). Another three delegations couple enforcement authority
with fairly weak sanctioning systems so as to minimize the cost of a legal loss—
CACJ, COMESA, and European Free Trade Area Court (EFTAC) courts can
find a violation but cannot authorize sanctions.
The exceptions to these statements include the ECJ, the ECHR, the ATJ,
and the ICC. In each of these cases, submission to IC authority gradually
developed over time through a series of sequential changes that each involved
greater sovereignty costs. The ECJ’s enforcement mechanism was originally

may actually hide where the action occurs. This bias may exist, but the data nonetheless suggests that
most international adjudication by ICs does not involve interstate dispute adjudication.
51. See text accompanying note 13.
52. See discussion supra note 15.
53. The ECCIS enforcement role is specific; Article 32 of the Charter of CIS allows the Economic
Court to help “ensure the observation of economic obligations.” Commonwealth of Independent States
Charter art. 32, June 22, 1993, 34 I.L.M. 1279. This has been interpreted by the ECCIS court as an
enforcement role that pertains to any rule that gives rise to “tangible benefits” for a party. For more
information on the ECCIS court, see Worldcourts.com, Economic Court of the Commonwealth of
Independent States Jurisdiction, http://www.worldcourts.com/eccis/eng/jurisdiction.htm (last visited
Feb. 7, 2008).
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combined with a “toothless” sanctioning system.54 When national courts started
enforcing ECJ rulings, Europe found itself to have, de facto, an uneven
enforcement mechanism—countries with more-robust national judiciaries were
held accountable to European law and were more likely to follow ECJ
decisions, compared to countries with weaker national judiciaries. In 1998,
European states added a European-level sanctioning mechanism to address this
imbalance. Although any European state can be fined for noncompliance, the
change was made mainly to confront the chronic noncompliers.55 To date there
have been very few fines levied, and there is little to suggest that this change has
significantly affected compliance levels with ECJ rulings—mainly because
national courts tend to enforce ECJ rulings directly.56
The ECHR has never had large sanctioning capabilities—its rulings
primarily carry social stigmas.57 The ECHR was originally designed to be
politically controllable; the ECHR’s commission was set up both to investigate
charges of human-rights abuses, and as a gatekeeper to ensure that frivolous
cases did not reach the court. Although at first reticent to refer matters to the
court,58 over time the commission became willing to refer more cases. By 1998,
the commission was no longer gatekeeping—it referred nearly every plausible
case to the ECHR. At that point, the commission mainly created an extra step
in the process. Thus, states decided to abolish the commission as a first step to
reaching the ECHR. Eventually membership in the Council of Europe, and
submission to the ECHR’s authority, became a signal that a government is
committed to following a liberal democratic path (and thereby is a candidate for
accession to the EU).59 Thus, European states now willingly submit to the
ECHR’s authority so that they can obtain the benefit of being part of the
European liberal democratic club.
The ATJ was created in 1984;60 it took until 1996 for the Junta to be
authorized by member states to bring an infringement suit against a state. In
1996, the Andean Pact adopted a number of changes to make the institution
more accessible, including allowing private actors to raise infringement suits

54. Federico Mancini & David Keeling, Democracy and the European Court of Justice, 57 MOD. L.
REV. 175, 183 (1994).
55. JONAS TALLBERG, EUROPEAN GOVERNANCE AND SUPRANATIONAL INSTITUTIONS:
MAKING STATES COMPLY 76–84 (2003).
56. See Tanja Börzel, Non-Compliance in the European Union: Pathology or Statistical Artifact, 8 J.
EUR. PUB. POL’Y 803 (1994).
57. ECHR can award compensation, but not punitive damages, to victims. Thus the fine is rarely
sufficient to serve as a deterrent. On ECHR fines, see DINAH SHELTON, REMEDIES IN
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 147–60 (1999).
58. The ECHR’s early case load was as follows: from 1959 through 1969, 10 decisions; from 1970
through 1979, 26 decisions; from 1980 through 1984, 58 decisions; from 1985 through 1989, 111
decisions. Data from A.H. ROBERTSON & J. G. MERRILLS, HUMAN RIGHTS IN EUROPE 310 (1994).
59. See Andrew Moravcsik, The Origins of Human Rights Regimes: Democratic Delegation in
Postwar Europe, 54 INT’L ORG. 217 (1994).
60. E. Barlow Keener, The Andean Common Market Court of Justice: Its Purpose, Structure, and
Future, 2 EMORY J. INT’L DISPUTE RESOLUTION 39, 50 (1987).
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directly with the ATJ should the General Secretariat refuse to raise a suit.61 This
change made it harder for states to keep the General Secretariat from pursuing
infringements, and it meant that the ATJ’s sanctioning system was finally
usable. As of June 2007, the ATJ has found sixty-one formal infringements of
Andean rules, leading to thirty authorizations of retaliation.62
In contrast to the evolutionary development of Europe’s courts and the
ECJ, the ICC began as a true departure for international criminal justice.
Historically, international criminal justice was victor’s justice—other-binding
delegation wherein the losers of the war were held accountable for their
violations despite the victors having committed similar crimes.63 Ad hoc
international criminal tribunals were other-binding delegations in the sense that
the actors supporting legal redress knew that they would not themselves be
subject to international criminal-justice efforts. The ad hoc courts were
nonetheless path-breaking delegations because they introduced a new model,
one in which all sides were held accountable for their crimes.64 Once the “all
sides equally accountable” model was adopted, it was not clear why certain
atrocities could have legal remedies (for example, crimes committed during the
Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and Sierra Leone crises), while other crimes escaped
punishment. The ICC is meant to generalize the “all sides accountable model,”
and it has been met with stiff resistance by some because the ICC self-binds
states.
One could look at the gradual strengthening of certain international
enforcement mechanisms and argue that there is a trend towards creating and
using international enforcement mechanisms. Indeed, the enforcement roles of
the GATT system, the Andean Community, the European Union, and the
European Human Rights system were all beefed up over time to increase the
opportunity and capacity of these ICs to hold states accountable to their legal
obligations.65 And, in the 1990s many states took the biggest plunge of all by
committing to the ICC’s general jurisdiction over all war crimes.

61. These changes were adopted by the Protocol Amending the Treaty Creating the Court of
Justice of the Cartagena Agreement, concluded on May 28, 1996, available at
http://www.comunidadandina.org/normativa/tratprot/cochabamba.htm (last visited Feb. 7, 2008)
[hereinafter Cochabamba Protocol] (amending the Treaty Creating the Court of Justice of the
Cartagena Agreement, concluded on May 28, 1979, 18 I.L.M. 1203 (1979) [hereinafter ATJ Treaty]).
62. These represent the cases not settled out of court; there have been 201 reasoned opinions
during the same time period (not all of which find infringements). Retaliatory sanctions in the Andean
context are similar to the WTO—a state is allowed to suspend concessions against another state up to
the authorized amount. Thus, noncompliance can be sanctioned only when states are interested in
retaliating. See SECRETARY GENERAL, ANDEAN COMMUNITY, INFORME DE LA SECRETARIA
GENERAL DE LA COMUNIDAD ANDINA 2006–2007 (June 14, 2007) (on file with author).
63. GARY JONATHAN BASS, STAY THE HAND OF VENGEANCE: THE POLITICS OF WAR CRIMES
TRIBUNALS 8–16 (2000).
64. The International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia is perhaps the clearest case of this model,
though the principle that all sides are accountable certainly holds for the ICTY’s Rwandan and Sierra
Leone counterparts.
65. GATT’s dispute-adjudication authority started as noncompulsory. After the U.S. started
unilaterally “enforcing” GATT rules, GATT states decided a more usable enforcement mechanism
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But if commitment to international legal enforcement is a sign of linear
progress, one must note how lumpy and unequal the commitment often is.
Enforcement mechanisms are the strongest for the issues the West cares most
about—trade and mass human-rights atrocities. Outside of Europe, delegation
of enforcement authority tends to bind the weak more than it binds the
powerful. For example, the WTO’s and ATJ’s sanctioning system of allowing
winning states to retaliate against states maintaining illegal trade barriers allows
the rich to essentially buy their way out of compliance by accepting retaliation
rather than complying.66 The ICC allows states to escape its authority by
prosecuting their own violators—which Western states are likely to do.
Although powerful actors have escape mechanisms to deal with IC
enforcement authority, it is noteworthy that wherever countries have precommitted to an IC’s enforcement authority (explicitly or as general
compulsory dispute adjudication), powerful and weak states have willingly
participated in legal suits that are brought. This fact stands in contrast to the
ICJ, in whose proceedings some countries have refused to participate (in cases
for which the ICJ’s jurisdiction was compulsory), forcing the ICJ to continue the
case with no defendant present.
C. International Delegation of Administrative Review Authority
Forty percent of ICs (eight of twenty) have been delegated explicit
administrative-review authority as indicated by the IC’s authority to review the
legality of any action, regulation, directive, or decision of a public actor, and its
authority to question failures to act. The OHADA court is categorized as a
dispute-resolution body since it does not have the explicit authority to hear
challenges regarding the legality of a public decision, but it will primarily hear
appeals of national-court rulings when the case involves a challenge to a public
decision regarding a private firm.67 If this court is added into the calculations,
forty-five percent of ICs play an administrative-review role.
Most of the ICs with administrative-review authority are embedded in
economic agreements (the exception to this rule is the ITLOS Seabed
authority). All eight agreements with explicit delegation of administrativereview authority also create supranational administrators with the power to
issue binding decisions. Thus, the delegation of administrative-review authority
appears to be a direct attempt to extend to the international level the sort of
legal protections found within domestic administrative states, and it appears to

would be preferable. When the WTO was created in 1994, its dispute-resolution mechanism was made
compulsory. On the WTO system, see BARTON ET AL., supra note 15, at 70–73.
66. Karen J. Alter, Resolving or Exacerbating Disputes? The WTO’s New Dispute Resolution
System, 79 INT’L AFF. 783, 786 (2003). See also Joost Pauwelyn, Enforcement and Countermeasures in
the WTO: Rules Are Rules—Toward a More Collective Approach, 94 AM. J. INT’L L. 335 (2000).
67. Note that an IC can end up engaged in administrative review in other ways. Dispute-resolution
cases, for example, can end up asking essentially administrative-review questions. ICs can exercise this
review, but their rulings will not per se nullify the questionable administrative decision, nor will they be
reviewing “failures to act.”
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be primarily other-binding delegation (true for the ATJ, the BCJ, the CACJ,
the Court of First Instance (CFI), COMESA, the ECJ, the EFTAC, and the
ITLOS contexts). Sometimes, however, there is a self-binding dimension to this
delegation too—found for the ECCIS, the OHADA, the ATJ, and the ECJ. In
these cases, domestic actors end up applying international agreements, which
has led to a concern that rules will be unevenly applied. This concern has led in
turn to a decision to submit national administration of the specific international
agreements to international supervision.
Administrative review requires compulsory jurisdiction and private access,
so as to allow those affected by administrative rulings to challenge them. All of
the ICs with administrative-review authority (both the eight ICs with explicit
administrative delegations, and the two with implicit administrative-review
delegations) have compulsory jurisdiction and private access for this role. Thus,
administrative-review powers can account for ten of the twelve ICs that have
private access and compulsory jurisdiction.
All ICs on this list play roles other than administrative review—be it dispute
resolution, constitutional review, or enforcement roles. But it is noteworthy that
the fewest caveats are placed on ICs in an administrative-review role as
compared to other roles. One sees a lack of caveats in terms of access rules—
administrative review and labor-dispute roles68 tend to be among the few places
in which private actors are allowed direct access to the IC.69 One also sees a lack
of caveats in that legal standing is rarely denied (in contrast to constitutional
review for the ATJ and ECJ in which private actors must show that the law in
question directly affects them).70
The busiest courts—the ATJ, the ECJ, and the CFI—find themselves most
occupied with respect to administrative-review cases—be they reviews of
supranational administrative rulings, or reviews of national efforts to implement
supranational regulations. This means that numerically speaking,
administrative-review cases account for the lion’s share of all international
litigation (all CFI cases, all ECJ direct-action cases, most ECJ preliminary-

68. A number of ICs have authority to adjudicate disputes between IOs and their employees.
69. The exception to this is the ITLOS body. Access is wide to the Seabed authority in this role,
but the types of challenges are circumscribed:
Without prejudice to article 191, in exercising its jurisdiction pursuant to article 187, the
Seabed Disputes Chamber shall not pronounce itself on the question of whether any rules,
regulations and procedures of the Authority are in conformity with this Convention, nor
declare invalid any such rules, regulations and procedures. Its jurisdiction in this regard shall
be confined to deciding claims that the application of any rules, regulations and procedures of
the Authority in individual cases would be in conflict with the contractual obligations of the
parties to the dispute or their obligations under this Convention, claims concerning excess of
jurisdiction or misuse of power, and to claims for damages to be paid or other remedy to be
given to the party concerned for the failure of the other party to comply with its contractual
obligations or its obligations under this Convention.
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 189, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 477.
70. There is no need to require heavy-handed remedies—administrative-review rulings primarily
remand an action to the administrative actor, nullifying the existing decision and requiring them to
issue a new one.
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ruling cases, all ATJ preliminary-ruling and nullification cases, all OHADA
cases, and all BENELUX cases)71—thus roughly 20,032 of the existing 33,057
cases brought to all ICs). If one adds in the reality that seventy-two percent of
ECHR rulings involve “access to justice” claims—charges that the national
administration of justice is either too slow or insufficiently respectful of
plaintiff’s due-process rights72—it becomes clear that numerically speaking, most
international litigation involves reviewing the actions of public implementers of
rules and policies. Although international review of national administrative
actions can compromise national autonomy, administrative review is mostly
other-binding and thus not deeply sovereignty-compromising. In any event,
when review is limited to the actions of IOs, no national sovereignty is
compromised.
D. International Delegation of Constitutional Review Authority
This analysis considers only explicit delegations of authority to ICs, thus not
the actions of ICs to expand or constitutionalize their authority. Four ICs
(twenty percent of all ICs) have been granted explicit authority to review the
legality of legislative acts. In all of the cases, the subject of review is designed to
be IO outputs—and thus the delegation is primarily other-binding. This review
role fits with Bradley and Kelley’s delegation of “oversight authority”—
providing states a means to oversee the actions of an international
organization.73 The ICs with explicit constitutional-review authority are
primarily common-market bodies—the ATJ, COMESA, and the ECJ. (The
CACJ also has constitutional-review authority.) All of these institutions have
supranational political bodies that can exercise delegated legislative authority in
that they can promulgate rules that are legally binding within domestic systems.
International constitutional-review authority subjects this rulemaking power to
constitutional review—which in most cases will involve reviewing the legality of
actions of supranational legislative bodies. The circumscribed nature of this
constitutional-review delegation perhaps explains why there are relatively few
caveats limiting access to, or IC authority in, this role—all ICs with this
delegated role have compulsory jurisdiction and private access.
The two other potential ICs in this category include the CCJ—whose role
will be determined when the supranational Secretariat’s and Council’s powers
are determined—and the ECHR, which some observers see as so completely
changed from its initial enforcement design as to now fit in this category.

71. Andean Tribunal cases seem to be mostly about intellectual property—well over ninety percent
of the cases. Laurence Helfer, Karen Alter, and Maria Flo Guerzovich have a project underway
examining this activity. Laurence Helfer, Karen J. Alter & Maria Flo Guerzovich, Constructing an
Intellectual Property Rule of Law in the Andean Community (unpublished manuscript, on file with
author).
72. Rachel Cichowski, Courts, Rights and Democratic Participation, 39 COMP. POL. STUD. 50, 65
(2006).
73. Bradley & Kelley, supra note 6, at 22.
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In sum, Table 2 presents a stark paper trend of creating ICs with both
private access and compulsory jurisdiction. Deeper investigation of this trend
reveals that wide access is mostly for other-binding roles—administrative
review and constitutional review of IO outputs. Diagram 2 below maps actual
delegations of IC authority onto the categories in Diagram 1 to capture which
actual delegations are sovereignty-compromising. Remember that ICs can be
delegated more than one role. The most extensive delegations of authority—in
terms of the different roles ICs are given, and the sovereignty-compromising
nature of the design of ICs—appear in economic agreements. It is interesting to
note that the most active ICs are those where the sovereignty costs of
delegation are highest. So one cannot conclude that sovereignty-compromising
delegation is merely symbolic. It is also true, however, that not all rulings
emerging from active courts compromise sovereignty, which may be why the
sovereignty costs are more politically palatable.
Diagram 2: Sovereignty Costs Associated With Delegation to ICs
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There is strong evidence that states have tried to limit the sovereigntycompromising nature of delegation to ICs. But the fundamental risk of
delegation to ICs remains. The original delegations of authority to the ECJ and
ECHR were not so sovereignty-compromising. But the ECHR and the ECJ
have ended up exercising their powers in ways that are deeply compromising of
national sovereignty.74 It was not so much the original grant of authority that
created this outcome, but rather the bold assertiveness of the ICs as they

74. KAREN J. ALTER, ESTABLISHING THE SUPREMACY OF EUROPEAN LAW: THE MAKING OF AN
INTERNATIONAL RULE OF LAW IN EUROPE 182–208 (2001); TALLBERG, supra note 55, at 92–127. See
also Helfer, supra note 31.
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exercised their authority. Indeed, the ATJ has the same structure as the ECJ—
with the same delegated roles and even wider private access to trigger
litigation—yet it has not exercised its authority in as sovereignty-compromising
a way.75 Meanwhile, the WTO’s appellate body was granted only a disputeadjudication role, and it lacks private access, but it has ended up ruling in ways
that do compromise national sovereignty whereas similarly designed bodies
(ECCIS, EFTAC, BCJ, CACJ, and COMESA) have not.76 All of this suggests
that the substance of the legal suits—itself an artifact of the court’s role—
matters more in determining the extent to which sovereignty is compromised
than does the fact of delegation or the design of the IC.
IV
CONCLUSION: THE SOVEREIGNTY
COSTS OF DELEGATION TO INTERNATIONAL COURTS
This article has aimed to correct the impression of what delegation to ICs is
about. Many scholars and practitioners assume that ICs primarily play an
interstate dispute-adjudication role, along the lines of the ICJ.77 Eric Posner and
John Yoo go so far as to suggest that given the heterogeneity of state
preferences, noncompulsory dispute adjudication is the only role ICs can play
effectively.78 Although dispute adjudication is a prevalent role delegated to ICs,
it is not the only role, and dispute adjudication is increasingly combined with
compulsory jurisdiction, making ICs more about enforcement—precisely what
Posner and Yoo dislike.79 In terms of IC dockets, interstate dispute adjudication
clearly is not the most prevalent role ICs play.
This analysis raises theoretical challenges for existing theories of IC
independence as it relates to compromise of national sovereignty. In Principal–
Agent (P-A) literature, ICs are presumed to be agents of the states that create
them, and independence is assessed in terms of the rules that shape the
principal’s ability to change the delegation contract.80 Principal–Agent theory
expects that the harder it is to sanction an agent through recontracting, the

75. Karen J. Alter, Exporting the European Court of Justice Model: The Experience of the
Andean Common Market Court of Justice (2007) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
76. CLAUDE BARFIELD, FREE TRADE, SOVEREIGNTY, DEMOCRACY 37–69 (2001). See also Alter,
supra note 66.
77. See Richard H. McAdams, Adjudicating in Anarchy: An Expressive Theory of International
Dispute Resolution, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1229 (2004); Richard H. McAdams, The Expressive
Power of Adjudication, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 1045 (2005).
78. Posner &Yoo, supra note 4.
79. See id. at 66.
80. See Geoffrey Garrett & Barry Weingast, Ideas, Interests and Institutions: Constructing the EC’s
Internal Market, in IDEAS AND FOREIGN POLICY 173 (Judith Goldstein & Robert O. Keohane eds.,
1993); Paul B. Stephan, Courts, Tribunals and Legal Unification - the Agency Problem, CHI. J. INT’L L.
333 (2002).
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more independent the agent, and the greater the agent slippage.81 The problem
with this theory, as applied to ICs, is immediately apparent. The rules for
sanctioning ICs through recontracting are largely uniform: international judges
are appointed for short terms (four to eight years); changing international rules,
the original delegation contract to punish judges, or a combination of both
tends to be hard (requiring unanimity or super-majorities); and cutting budgets
slows the administration of justice but does not affect judicial autonomy. Given
the vast similarity of the sanctioning mechanisms for ICs, it is clear that
recontracting rules cannot explain variation in the extent of charges of IC
slippage. 82 The failure of P-A theory to explain the variation in IC slippage
highlights a problem with the assumptions of P-A theory; it is not true that the
more independent ICs, the more likely judges are to deviate from the wishes of
the principal. Rather, judicial roles significantly define how judges approach
their interpretive task. In some IC roles, courts are not really agents of the
states but are mechanisms states use to oversee the behavior of others (IOs, or
signatories to the agreement). In other roles, ICs are designed to challenge
illegal state practices. ICs would lose their legitimacy as legal actors if they shied
from their given role because of political pressure. If IC judges must choose
between adopting a transparently political decision or accepting a political
sanction, ICs may actually find the political sanction to be the more appealing
option.
Legal literature does not focus on state ability to “sanction” judges through
recontracting, but shares the assumption that independence is associated with
slippage. Posner, Yoo, and to some extent Bradley and Kelley expect IC
independence and thus the sovereignty costs of delegation to ICs to be shaped
by whether international courts have compulsory jurisdiction and whether
private actors are allowed to initiate disputes.83 Posner and Yoo expect
compliance with IC rulings to be less likely when a state is an unwilling litigant,
and thus they expect ICs with compulsory jurisdiction to be less effective
overall in inducing compliance with the law. 84 Table 2 shows a trend of creating
ICs with compulsory jurisdiction and private access, and thus highly
independent ICs. There is more controversy surrounding ICs today than in the
past, but given that there are more ICs, and given the seventy-five percent rise
in IC activity, the increase in controversial rulings is not surprising. It is hard to
say that the design trend itself has led to an increase in ICs being charged with
“running amok.” Indeed, a number of ICs with compulsory jurisdiction and

81. Darren G. Hawkins et al., Delegation under Anarchy: States, International Organizations, and
Principal-Agent Theory, in DELEGATION AND AGENCY IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 3, 27–31
(Darren G. Hawkins et al. eds., 2006).
82. See Karen J. Alter, Delegation to International Courts and the Limits of Re-Contracting Political
Power, in DELEGATION AND AGENCY IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 312 (Darren G. Hawkins
et al. eds., 2006).
83. See Posner & Yoo, supra note 4, at 25; Bradley & Kelley, supra note 6, at 30.
84. Posner & Yoo’s argument, supra note 4, has been ably critiqued. See Helfer & Slaughter, supra
note 38.
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private access do not seem to generate controversy (for example, the ATJ,
COMESA, the CACJ, and OHADA)—and not simply because these systems
are not used. Meanwhile, ICs without these design features do seem to
engender controversy—such as the ICJ, which lacks compulsory jurisdiction
and private access, and the WTO and ICC, which lack private access. The
reason is the same as above—certain roles are inherently other-binding (and
thus not sovereignty-compromising) and in certain roles judges are more likely
to be deferential to legislative intent, thereby avoiding compromising
sovereignty or engendering controversy.
Nor does the extent to which sovereignty is compromised correspond
entirely with the legal effect or sanctioning power of a court. All ICs considered
in this analysis can issue binding rulings.85 There are variations in enforcement
mechanisms for IC rulings, but these variations do not seem to account either
for variation in sovereignty risks or in respect for IC rulings. For two reasons,
sanctioning power is not key: First, in all cases, courts rely primarily on
voluntary compliance by the parties—indeed Martin Shapiro argues that all
courts, from weak to strong, seek the consent of their parties, crafting rulings
that offer each side the chance to claim partial victory.86 Indeed, most actors
follow IC rulings simply because the IC is the authoritative body charged with
interpreting the law. Second, the stronger the enforcement mechanism, the less
likely it is to actually be used. For example, ICJ rulings can be backed up by the
use of force, but the United Nations Security Council has never authorized such
a backup because doing so would be a drastic step of great political significance.
Indeed, international legal systems with sanctioning mechanisms—like the
systems of the WTO and ECJ—rarely invoke the sanctioning mechanisms, nor
is it clear that the mere possibility of appealing to sanctions systematically
increases compliance with legal rulings.87 These reasons are why international
lawyers like Louis Henkin, Abraham Chayes, Harold Koh, and Thomas Franck
emphasize the legitimacy of legal rulings over the strong, direct sanctions such
as the use of force or criminal punishment.88 Chayes goes so far as stating that
efforts to improve compliance by adding sanctions are a “waste of time.”89

85. The ability to issue binding rulings is inherent to PICT’s definition of an IC. Supra note 1.
86. MARTIN SHAPIRO, COURTS: A COMPARATIVE POLITICAL ANALYSIS 8–17 (1981).
87. Eric Reinhardt and Marc Busch have found that states are most likely to make concessions
before a WTO ruling is issued, so that it is in fact the hardest cases—those where compliance is least
likely—that end up in court. Marc L. Busch & Eric Reinhardt, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law:
Early Settlement in GATT/WTO Disputes, 24 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 158, 158–59 (2000–2001). There are
certainly examples in which countries continued noncompliance up until the day that retaliatory
sanctions would kick in, but in systems where enforcement mechanisms were added (such as the ECJ),
there is little evidence that general compliance improved once sanctions for noncompliance became
possible. See TALLBERG, supra note 55, at 57–68, 135–38; Börzel, supra note 56.
88. See THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS 193 (1990); LOUIS
HENKIN, HOW NATIONS BEHAVE 9–10, 45–46 (1968); ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER
CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY (1995); Harold Hong Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International
Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599 (1997).
89. Chayes & Chayes, supra note 88.

02__ALTER.DOC

Winter 2008]

6/9/2008 8:01:32 AM

DELEGATING TO INTERNATIONAL COURTS

75

Rather than focus on contract design, this article examined the roles
delegated to courts showing how contract design largely follows from the
judicial roles delegated to courts. International Courts with explicit
enforcement and constitutional roles require compulsory jurisdiction for these
roles. International Courts with explicit administrative roles also require private
access. Indeed, ICs granted constitutional, administrative, and enforcement
roles were also granted compulsory jurisdiction (with the exception of the
IACHR), and, in the case of administrative and constitutional roles, they were
granted private access. Because the administrative and constitutional roles are
primarily other-binding, little national sovereignty is being compromised
through delegation—which is why compulsory jurisdiction and private access do
not per se translate into a compromise of national sovereignty.
The assumptions about IC independence create misperceptions, which are
then fed by a bias in American scholarship on ICs. Most scholars follow the
political controversy—writing about rulings because the decision upset
expectations or the desire of powerful actors, especially the United States or
European states. The assumption is that controversial rulings are the most
significant and sovereignty-compromising IC rulings. But really, the preferences
of state actors, rather than the legal or policy significance of a ruling or the
extent to which sovereignty is compromised, determine whether an IC ruling is
controversial. American politicians have reacted strongly to WTO rulings even
when the WTO rulings represented reasonable interpretations of the law, and
the cost of the ruling was fairly insignificant in dollar and political terms.
Meanwhile, when the ECJ extended the reach of European gender-equality
provisions, ruling that the German constitutional ban on women in combat
support roles violates European law, there was relatively little political
controversy. The ECJ’s ruling was deeply sovereignty compromising—requiring
Germany to change its constitution and fundamentally change the German
military—an institution extremely close to the heart of national sovereignty.90
But, neither the ECJ ruling nor the constitutional change was controversial
because many Germans supported increasing the role of women in the
military.91
If, instead of following controversy, scholars followed the litigants, they
would be writing more about ICs’ involvement in private–public dispute
adjudication, enforcement, and administrative review, and about how most of
these rulings are exactly what states hoped for when they delegated authority to
ICs. If scholars focused more on IC jurisprudence in its various judicial roles
and on the political impact of the jurisprudence, we would have a greater sense
of when and how ICs facilitate state compliance with international rules—which
really is the only way to ascertain how effective an international legal system
actually is. We may also find that whether or not a ruling is sovereignty90. GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [Constitution] art. 12 (F.R.G.) (as amended through Dec. 12, 2000).
91. Case C-285/98, Tanja Kreil v. Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 2000 E.C.R. I-69; Gerhard
Kuemmel, Changing State Institutions: The German Military and the Integration of Women 7 (2003).
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compromising is epiphenomenal—that IC rulings that do not compromise
sovereignty nonetheless generate controversy whereas highly sovereigntycompromising IC rulings elicit compliance without complaints.
Finally, this analysis reveals the limits of focusing on design features to
explain IC behavior. This study can tell us what roles were explicitly delegated
to ICs, but not what roles ICs come to play. It can tell us which roles, and thus
which courts, are more likely to end up compromising national sovereignty, but
not which ICs actually do end up compromising national sovereignty. In the
end, the cases that are raised, and the audacity of judges in exercising their
authority (or extending their authority) will ultimately determine when and to
what extent national sovereignty becomes compromised by delegation to ICs.
Fearing that sovereignty will be compromised, conservative commentators
condemn nearly all delegations to international courts. This analysis reveals the
extent to which fearful critics like Robert Bork, Claude Barfield, and Jeremy
Rabkin are offering as examples just a small sliver of what ICs actually do.92 The
point is not to eliminate self-binding delegation while retaining all otherbinding forms of delegation—indeed, eliminating all risk would be impossible.
Before we discard the baby with the bathwater, we would be better off
considering the benefits and costs of delegation to ICs as a package deal.
Delegation to ICs provides many benefits—far more than ICs as “simple
problem solving devices” that can provide information that helps states resolve
disagreements.93 In the vast majority of cases, ICs are providing benefits by
doing exactly what member states asked them to do—reviewing administrative
decisionmaking, ensuring international institutions do not exceed their power,
and enforcing international agreements so that states can capture the benefits of
the treaties. In a small minority of cases, national sovereignty is compromised—
often by design, but also in surprising ways. People will come out differently in
weighing this balance. For some, simply the idea that an international actor can
tell a national actor what to do is intolerable. But, it is worth pointing out the
direction of the trend. The empirical record shows an increasing willingness to
create and use ICs, suggesting that most states are quite comfortable with the
balance of costs to benefits as it stands.

92. See ROBERT H. BORK, COERCING VIRTUE: THE WORLDWIDE RULE OF JUDGES (2003);
JEREMY A. RABKIN, LAW WITHOUT NATIONS?: WHY CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT REQUIRES
SOVEREIGN STATES (2005); JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005); Posner & Yoo, supra note 4.
93. Posner & Yoo, supra note 4, at 6, 19, 22.

